Note: Offical layout of letter has not been captured below.
Maine Citizen Trade Policy Commission
Senator Margaret Rotundo, Co-Chair
Representative
John Patrick, Co-Chair
June 2, 2005
The Honorable Olympia J. Snowe
United States Senate
154 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-1903
The Honorable Susan M. Collins
United States Senate
154 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-1903
The Honorable Thomas H. Allen
United States House of Representatives
1717 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D.C 20515
The Honorable Michael H. Michaud
United States House of Representatives
437 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, D.C 20515
Dear Senator Snowe, Senator Collins, Congressman Allen and Congressman
Michaud:
The Citizen Trade Policy Commission adopted the following statement
unanimously on May 27, 2005. The Commission was established by
the Maine Legislature in 2004 to assess and monitor the legal and
economic impacts of trade agreements on state and local laws, working
conditions and the business environment; to provide a mechanism for
citizens and Legislators to voice their concerns and recommendations;
and to make policy recommendations designed to protect Maine's jobs,
business environment and laws from any negative impact of trade
agreements. The Commission includes Legislators from at least two
political parties and citizens representing a wide variety of Maine
constituencies impacted by trade. (See attached Commission membership
list)
Statement on Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free
Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA)
The Maine Citizen Trade Policy Commission supports international
trade. Countries improve overall economic welfare by producing
those goods at which they are relatively efficient, while trading for
the rest. Trade can improve productivity, lower the price of
consumer goods, and increase consumer selection, potentially benefiting
both workers and consumers. Larger global markets for Maine
products can help maximize the benefits of trade for Maine workers and
consumers.
However, in recent years trade agreements such as the North American
Free Trade Agreement have created both winners and losers. That has
been apparent in Maine, with scores of closed factories, thousands of
jobs lost to the surge of imports, and many communities struggling to
survive. Globalization may be inevitable, but the details of any
trade agreement are not. Because the rules of globalization reach
far beyond border measures such as tariffs and quotas, potentially
impacting every realm of public policy, the details of a trade
agreement should be publicly accessible and critically examined before
we decide whether or not to support it. Public scrutiny will
strengthen, not undermine, globalization.
The Maine Citizen Trade Policy Commission believes that trade
agreements should:
∑ Promote and strengthen basic human rights, labor rights, and
environmental protections, and raise standards in developing countries
in order to prevent a “race to the bottom” which hurts Maine
businesses, workers, and communities.
∑ Safeguard local and state lawmaking authority and level the playing
field for small businesses in Maine and elsewhere.
∑ Guard against the unintended consequence of impeding access to basic
human services such as education, healthcare, energy, and water.
∑ Be negotiated in a public and transparent manner.
DR-CAFTA does not meet our standards for an acceptable trade agreement
for several reasons. We are particularly concerned with
DR-CAFTA’s impacts on our state sovereignty and labor standards across
the region. During two public hearings on DR-CAFTA held in Bangor and
Portland over the past several months, we heard citizen testimony that
ranged widely in scope, but was overwhelmingly opposed to
DR-CAFTA. People worried about economic issues such as
outsourcing, labor standards, and impacts on small businesses, but also
voiced concerns about the possibility of maintaining and creating
policies pertaining to public services, environmental protection,
prescription drugs, municipal zoning, and social security. Many
people also spoke about DR-CAFTA’s impact on Central America’s small
farmers, many of whom would be forced to abandon their land for factory
work in sweatshop conditions in their own countries or emigrate to the
United States. Others were concerned that there is no avenue for
meaningful public input in trade negotiations. Many people urged the
Commission to take a stand against DR-CAFTA and recommend that Maine’s
Congressional delegation votes against it. For a summary of the
public hearings, please see:
http://www.state.me.us/legis/opla/citpol.htm
Based on our own analysis of DR-CAFTA and the concerns of the citizens
and constituencies we represent, we urge you to actively work against
the passage of DR-CAFTA. At a time when several Maine communities
may be facing dramatic job loss and disruption as a result of proposed
military base closures, we would only compound our problems with a
trade agreement that will diminish opportunities for those who need
them the most. While Maine can make its voice heard on the question of
military base closures and possibly influence the final decision,
DR-CAFTA has been created through a process that completely excludes
citizens and elected representatives from meaningful participation, and
contributes to the lack of trust and confidence that citizens have
about trade agreements.
Higher quality trade agreements that meet the Commission standards
require state and citizen discussion of trade policy and an avenue for
our concerns to be heard in trade negotiations. Maine joins many other
states in requesting regular and meaningful consultation with the
United States Trade Representative office to correct the democracy
deficit in trade negotiations. We are deeply appreciative of the
role Maine’s Congressional delegation has played in fighting for fair
trade agreements that promote the interests of Maine workers,
businesses, and communities. We look forward to working with you
to develop a new trade negotiation process that is democratic and
transparent, and accountable to the diverse voices and interests in
Maine.
Sincerely,
Senator Margaret Rotundo
Co-Chair
Representative John Patrick
Co-Chair
Cc: Rob Portman, Ambassador, United States
Trade Representative
Governor John E. Baldacci
Members, Citizen Trade Policy Commission
Alan Stearns, Senior Policy Advisor, Office of the
Governor
Appendix
The following sections on “Democracy and Sovereignty Issues, “ “Labor
and Small Business Issues,” “Impact on Central America and Consequences
for Maine,” and “Process of Trade Negotiations” contain our analysis
and concerns about DR-CAFTA. The Appendix should not be read as
an exhaustive analysis or a comprehensive view of the DR-CAFTA issues
relevant for Maine.
Democracy and Sovereignty Issues
International trade agreements such as CAFTA, NAFTA, and GATS would
make it possible for global corporations to override local controls on
development, zoning and planning. Such agreements may also be used to
override local and state environmental regulations, as well as national
labor and safety standards.
-- Valerie Carter, Ph.D., CTPC Public Hearing, Bangor, February 3, 2005
DR-CAFTA’s Chapter 11 (Cross-Border Trade in Services) could weaken
Maine’s regulatory authority. Like the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS), it requires signatories to ensure “conformity of
all laws, regulations, and administrative procedures” to the agreements
(Agreement Establishing the WTO, Article XVI: 4). Thus, when a country
commits a specific service sector to DR-CAFTA rules it must conform its
domestic policy – including laws, regulations, administrative
decisions, and even unwritten practices maintained by all levels of
government: central, regional, and local – to the requirements of the
trade agreement. The rules also apply to non-governmental authorities
in exercise of power delegated by governments, including professional
associations, boards of hospitals, schools, universities, and
standard-setting bodies (CAFTA, Article 11.1.2). Furthermore,
while only those services explicitly committed are covered by
DR-CAFTA’s rules, DR-CAFTA’s scope is tied to the scope of GATS, and
GATS mandates continuous rounds of renegotiation to increase
liberalization of trade in services and pressure countries to remove
exceptions to GATS rules and commit ever more service areas to the
Agreement. As GATS expands, so will regional trade agreements, such as
DR-CAFTA.
The expansion of GATS rules may also impact future interpretations of
DR-CAFTA provisions. A World Trade Organization working group on
domestic regulations is currently working on new “disciplines” on
domestic regulations that may include a “necessity test” and a list of
“legitimate objectives” that would be used to assess the level of
trade-restrictiveness of a government measure. If and when finalized,
the GATS disciplines would be directly imported into DR-CAFTA according
to DR-CAFTA Article 11.8 (3). Professional licensing,
qualification requirements, and technical standards governing
hospitals, nursing homes, physicians, nurses, or HMOs that ensure the
quality of healthcare delivery may have to face necessity tests.
Currently, the United States has committed to necessity tests for
accounting, engineering, and architecture that may become a precedent
for other sectors, including healthcare. The domestic regulation rule
can ultimately be used to challenge the federalist system of separate
state laws that promotes diversity and encourages states to act as
“laboratories of democracy.” A challenger could claim that a
state law is more burdensome than necessary if there are less stringent
laws in other states with similar conditions.
Investment Rules
[NAFTA’s Chapter 11 provisions] have raised serious problems with
the ability of state and local governments to take constitutional
actions to protect public welfare and the environment.
These provisions compensate disappointed investors from other countries
under a vague standard that is potentially much more expansive than
that available for domestic investors who claim a regulatory taking in
our courts. In effect, these provisions may require
government to pay foreign investors for the right to enforce its
environmental regulations.
-- Maine Attorney General Steven Rowe, August 25, 2002
As a state that values clean air, clean water and clean energy, Maine
often leads the country in enacting progressive environmental laws. For
example, during the last session, the Maine legislature passed "An Act
to Protect Human Health by Reducing Exposure to Arsenic." This law
speeds the phase-out of arsenic treated lumber. Arsenic is known to
cause cancer, and children are exposed to it when they play on jungle
gyms and decks built with arsenic-treated lumber. The Maine Bureau of
Health found health risks from arsenic in pressure-treated lumber were
just as high as the risks from exposure to arsenic in drinking water.
Under NAFTA, it's possible that a Canadian corporation that produces
arsenic-treated lumber could sue the U.S. over the Maine ban because of
lost market share.
-- Maureen Drouin, Northeast Regional Representative, Sierra Club, CTPC
Public Hearing, Bangor, February 3, 2005
Modeled on NAFTA’s Chapter 11 investor-state dispute resolution
mechanism, DR-CAFTA’s Chapter 10 investment rules give a foreign
investor the right to seek monetary compensation for a federal, state,
or local regulatory action the company alleges to be either a direct or
indirect expropriation of their profits. Because these investment
rules include more expansive property rights than the United States
Constitution grants domestic businesses, DR-CAFTA’s Chapter 10 appears
to violate the “no greater rights” for foreign investors mandate
included in the 2002 Trade Promotion Act.
DR-CAFTA Chapter 10 in effect redefines public regulation as a
government “taking” of private property that requires compensation to
the owner, just as when a government takes private land for a highway
or park and has to pay its fair market value. Because DR-CAFTA
Chapter 10 includes broad standings language, allowing a domestic
corporation with substantial business interests in another party to use
the investor-state dispute resolution mechanism to challenge a domestic
law, a Central American subsidiary of a U.S. company could potentially
use DR-CAFTA to challenge Maine laws it considers to be “tantamount to
expropriation.”
For example, a casino based in a DR-CAFTA member country, or with
substantial business interest in a DR-CAFTA member country, could
challenge state restrictions on gambling. In the recent GATS
gambling case against the United States brought by Antigua and Barbuda,
the World Trade Organization Appellate Body ruled that the United
States had made a GATS commitment to open up all forms of gambling to
international competition, but did allow for the United States to use
the GATS Article XX “public morals exceptions” to defend certain
restrictions on gambling. However, DR-CAFTA’s Chapter 10 does not
provide for a public morals exception. The State of Maine
maintains strict limits on “games of chance” and gambling via
electronic video machines that appear to violate DR-CAFTA Market Access
rules that prohibit quantitative limits on, and exclusive suppliers of,
committed services. These limits and Maine’s future ability
to regulate gambling appear to be at risk in the event of a challenge
under Chapter 10 of DR-CAFTA
Access to Public Services
Do trade treaties like CAFTA and the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (the
GATS) make Social Security privatization a one-way street? Could they
'lock-in' even partial privatization forever? It is important to note
that these questions are not partisan ones. Whether or not one supports
the proposed privatization of Social Security makes little difference
in this discussion. What this Commission deals with and what makes the
Commission so important is asking the question, "How might these trade
agreements affect us in our day to day lives?" That is something I
think we can all get behind.
-- Alexander Aman, CTPC Public Hearing, Bangor, February 3, 2005
Expansion of DR-CAFTA rules to cover traditional public services such
as water, sewer, environmental protection and education could require
extension of public subsidies to foreign private competitors.
DR-CAFTA’s national treatment rule requires governments to allow
foreign service providers to compete on equal terms with local public
providers for taxpayer funds. For example, a foreign corporation
bidding to provide water delivery services in a Maine municipality must
be given the same favorable treatment as the public agency that
traditionally has provided the service, including public funding and
access to infrastructure. The low bidder wins. The result
could be privatization of water delivery services. Privatization
would be a one-way street. Once a public service has been opened
to free trade, the price for closing the market to foreign access is to
pay the investors what they would have made had it remained open.
Proponents of current services rules argue that public services are
excluded from GATS and DR-CAFTA’s Chapter 11 since the rules do not
apply to “services supplied in exercise of governmental authority,”
which it defines as services supplied “neither on a commercial basis,
nor in competition with one or more service providers” (CAFTA, Article
11.1.6). On the other hand, when a government does act on a
commercial basis (e.g., charges a fee for the service provided) or in
competition with other service suppliers, its activities are to be
treated like those of any other private supplier. Maine provides few
services exclusively on a non-commercial basis.
Whether or not to privatize is a debate we should have publicly, and a
decision we should make democratically. Unless public services
are clearly and unambiguously excluded from DR-CAFTA, the Agreement
could deprive us of the right to make these decisions, in effect
forcing the transformation of public services into tradable commodities.
Government Purchasing Rules
In Governor Baldacci's State of the State address, he talked about how
The State of Maine
now purchases 40% of its electricity from Maine's own renewable power
resources; that
they heat state office buildings with biodiesel, and that they are
improving the fuel economy
of the State fleet by purchasing more hybrids and smaller vehicles.
According to the Governor, these energy savings steps have saved the
State $776,000 in transportation fuel costs and reduced state
government greenhouse gas emissions by 8% just in the past two years.
Under CAFTA, these preferences could be considered inappropriate trade
barriers and challenged.
-- Maureen Drouin, Northeast Regional
Representative, Sierra Club, CTPC Public Hearing, Bangor, February 3,
2005
Government procurement rules in DR-CAFTA Chapter 9 limit the use of
non-economic criteria for government purchasing, depriving the public
control over the use of public funds, and diminishing the value of
government procurement as a public policy tool. The rules may
conflict with Maine policies, initiatives, and preferences such as:
∑ Recycled paper and fuel efficient cars, because technical
specifications must be limited to “performance requirements;”
∑ Products made in non-sweatshop conditions, because supplier
qualifications must be limited to their “legal, technical and financial
abilities” to fulfill a procurement and may not include criteria
related to the methods of production;
∑ In-state suppliers, because our trading partners’ suppliers must be
accorded treatment “no less favorable” than the “most favorable
treatment” we give to domestic suppliers; and
∑ Banning state contractors from shipping jobs overseas, because
contractor conditions to “encourage local development” are forbidden.
While the State of Maine has opted, at this time, not to allow USTR to
offer Maine’s government procurement market to DR-CAFTA parties and
would not need to adhere to its government procurement rules, it is
also of concern that federal government procurement policies would have
to conform to DR-CAFTA’s Chapter 9 rules. Unless changed through
DR-CAFTA implementing legislation or exempted in the Agreement, such
policies as Buy America laws and the prohibition of federal acquisition
of products produced by forced or indentured child labor (by Executive
Order 13126) could be subject to challenge.
Labor and Small Business Issues
“[The] differences between the rights of business and the rights of
labor are enormous [in CAFTA]. When injuries happen to commercial or
business interests, countries are severely punished through trade
sanctions that are equal to the original injury. These can be enormous.
For example, Europe is currently in the position of levying $4 billion
in trade sanctions against theU.S. Fines for labor rights violations
are miniscule in comparison, as they are capped at $15 million. Worse
yet, the violator gets to pay itself! Though this fine is supposed to
be used to help the country correct the violation of labor rights,
there is nothing in the agreement to prevent a country from paying
itself a fine, then shifting money from one budget to another and so
effectively side-stepping the intent of the fine.”
-- Jack McKay, President, Greater Bangor Area Central Labor Council,
CTPC Public Hearing, Bangor, February 3, 2005
I am willing to compete with any worker in the world for labor... But I
do not want to compete with children who are forced to beg for their
existence when they lose vital body parts. I do not want to compete
with companies that are allowed to pollute the air and water to gain a
price advantage. Give us trade agreements with level playing fields…
and Maine will compete and survive. We will have a shoe industry,
garment manufacture, a growing paper industry, family farms and a place
for my business too. Then Maine will truly be "the way life should be.”
-- Allyn Beecher, Owner, Monroe Millworks, CTPC Public Hearing, Bangor,
February 3, 2005
Export processing zones, where maquila factories operate and mostly
women 15-25 years old provide cheap labor under poor conditions, are
already prevalent throughout Central America. These zones would expand
dramatically under DR-CAFTA. Widely acknowledged human rights
abuses in these zones include non-enforcement of health, safety, and
labor regulations, hostility toward union organizing, excessive working
hours, and dangerous working environments. Human rights monitors
such as the U.S. State Department, the International Labor
Organization, and Human Rights Watch have recognized that labor law
enforcement in many Central American countries is inadequate.
While DR-CAFTA should require national labor laws to meet International
Labor Organization core standards, such as the right to organize unions
(“freedom of association”) and bargain collectively, its Article 16.1
calls on parties to “strive to ensure” such standards, only requiring
that parties enforce their existing labor laws. However even this
requirement is compromised by:
∑ Article 16.2.1(b), which gives each party “the right to exercise
discretion with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory,
and compliance matters and to make decisions regarding the allocation
of resources to enforcement with respect to other labor matters
determined to have higher priorities.” Thus parties can decide to not
enforce key portions of their existing labor law by allocating
resources elsewhere. Article 16.6.7 ensures that any such decision not
become the subject of an arbitral (dispute resolution) panel.
∑ Article 16.2.2, which does not prohibit a country from weakening its
existing labor law protections in order to attract investment. The
article only says that countries “shall strive to ensure” that they do
not do so. Article 16.6.7 ensures that any such weakening of labor law
not become the subject of an arbitral panel.
∑ Article 20.17, which does not allow DR-CAFTA arbitral panels to
suspend parties’ tariff benefits when they violate DR-CAFTA’s labor
provisions. If a party violated DR-CAFTA’s commercial provisions,
such as the intellectual property rights rules or market access rules,
it could face trade sanctions under article 20.16. But even if a
country systematically refused to enforce its own labor laws, it would
only face fines, capped at $15 million annually as long as the
violation continues. Because tariff benefits can only be
suspended if a party fails to pay a fine, not because it fails to
address a violation, there is no way to compel remediation. A
country can choose to pay a fine indefinitely and enjoy DR-CAFTA
benefits while systematically failing to enforce its own labor
laws. Furthermore, the fines would be given back to the violating
country “for appropriate labor … initiatives, including efforts to
improve or enhance labor … law enforcement.” However, DR-CAFTA does not
prohibit a violating party from simultaneously redirecting existing
funds away from labor law enforcement. Thus the net result of labor law
violations could be zero.
It is important to note that DR-CAFTA is a step backward from existing
trade related labor protections in the region. Currently, the General
System of Preferences and the Caribbean Basin Initiative directly
condition market access on respect for International Labor Organization
core standards. The credible threat of reduced trade benefits is
responsible for most significant labor reforms in Central America over
the last two decades. CAFTA would destroy the only proven
effective means to raising the bar for workers in the Americas.
Central America is already a very small export market. The
largest market, the Dominican Republic, is equivalent to Bakersfield,
California; the smallest, Nicaragua is equivalent to Lawrence, Kansas.
Portland’s market size is larger than Honduras, fifth on the list, and
Bangor’s is larger than Nicaragua’s. The region as a whole is
Maine’s 13th largest trading partner; the region without the Dominican
Republic is Maine’s 29th largest trading partner. The weak
labor standards in DR-CAFTA will do nothing to increase the
significance of this export market for Maine businesses. Export
production workers in Central America – that is, those workers whose
wages and living standards could be directly impacted by trade
agreements – usually earn no more than legal minimum wages which are
barely sufficient to meet the basic food requirements of a family, let
alone other basic needs. Tying trade benefits to payment of non-poverty
wages, or even median wages for the country of manufacture, would be
one way to increase the market size of this region, potentially
benefiting Maine export businesses. However, DR-CAFTA’s labor
provisions will only accelerate the race to the bottom, depriving Maine
businesses of the potential benefits of a trade agreement with stronger
labor standards.
Impact on Central America and Consequences for Maine
“When we lived in the village [of Carasque, El Salvador] it soon became
apparent that … the majority of Salvadorans are not entrepreneurs
looking for a low tariff environment for exporting their products. They
are subsistence farmers who grow corn, rice, and beans to feed their
families, and try to sell their extra at market to buy other staple
items, shoes and medicines. For these people free trade agreements like
CAFTA mean freedom for them to compete with subsidized agribusinesses
from the U.S., which have driven the price they can get for their corn
lower than their cost to produce it, even if one discounts their labor
as entirely free.”
-- Katherine Kates, Bangor-El Salvador Sister City Project, PICA, CTPC
Public Hearing, Bangor, February 3, 2005
As all trade agreements, DR-CAFTA will create both winners and
losers. In Central America, the beneficiaries of DR-CAFTA
are likely to be large importers of foodstuffs and manufactured goods,
bankers and other financial groups that mediate the investments of
foreign corporations, owners and developers of free-trade zone assembly
plants, those who profit from the sale of public government services to
private businesses, and those who profit from selling these services to
their countrymen. These groups belong to the wealthiest
sectors of Central American society.
The large majority of the population, small subsistence farmers, will
face a flood of imported U.S. agricultural products that may destroy
their livelihoods. Under DR-CAFTA over half of
current U.S. farm exports to Central America would become duty free
immediately, including cotton, wheat, soybeans, certain fruits and
vegetables, and processed food products. Other agricultural
products have a gradual tariff phase-out schedule, with up to 20 years
for products such as rice and dairy. Tariffs on yellow corn, a
key subsistence crop and source of income for many Central American
farming communities, would be completely phased out in 15 years, down
from the current high of 45 percent tariffs. The
consequences for small farmers will be hunger, disruption of families
and communities, and exploitation in sweatshops or a dangerous trek
north. In the terms of the U.S. Congressional Research Service:
“…countries dependent on small subsistence farms require time to
accommodate the structural adjustment taking place as their economies
transition toward larger farms, manufacturing, and services.”
This “structural adjustment” in Central America will have consequences
for the United States and Maine. Increasing the cheap labor
supply for manufacturing in Central America will contribute to downward
pressure on wages and work-related benefits in the region and increase
competitive pressures on Maine businesses that now provide wages
adequate for Maine workers and families.
Furthermore, when small independent farms are squeezed out of markets
and small farmers are pushed off their land by giant agribusinesses,
and when export-oriented economies stimulated by free trade agreements
fail to create enough new good jobs to replace all those that are
eliminated, the pressure to migrate legally or illegally
increases. Unauthorized immigration from Mexico to the United
States increased sharply after NAFTA’s implementation, more than
doubling between 1990 and 2000, as more than 1.5 million Mexican
peasant farmers were forced to abandon their land. Similarly,
DR-CAFTA is likely to increase immigration to the United States from
Central America. Immigrant workers in the United States,
especially those with illegal status, face numerous challenges
including low-paying jobs, discrimination, exploitation, inadequate
access to social services, and limited legal rights, challenges that
are exacerbated for those immigrants that do not have legal
status. This issue was brought to light in Maine in September
2002, when 14 loggers from Honduras and Guatemala perished as their
van, traveling at an unsafe speed, slipped off a one-lane bridge into
the Allagash River. The immigrants were coffee growers and rural
workers in their home countries; in Maine they were planting and
harvesting pine trees destined for paper mills. Desperate to pay
off large loans to recruiters who brought them to the United States and
to send remittances back home to their families, the loggers were
speeding to extend the working day. Their employer had been cited
numerous times by the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division for
unpaid overtime work, and has now lost its license to operate for
failing to ensure the safety of workers.
Process of Trade Negotiations
As a citizen who helped to make this Commission possible I ask you to
insert Maine's human voice in those [trade] negotiations wherever
possible. Specifically, please investigate
and raise questions about whether Maine people really benefit by having
health care, including state healthcare services, covered under any
specific trade agreement. Will Maine citizens benefit? Will doctors,
nurses, and healthcare providers in general benefit? Will businesses
and working people benefit? Will children benefit?
-- Dr. Sara Stalman, CTPC Public Hearing, Bangor, February 3, 2005
Given the far-reaching consequences of DR-CAFTA for state regulatory
authority and state policies, the non-transparent and undemocratic
trade negotiation process is particularly troublesome. The only
formal mechanism for public input into trade negotiations is the United
States Trade Representative’s Trade Advisory Committee (TAC)
system. The system consists of 27 advisory committees that
overwhelmingly represent commercial interests: 22 of the 27 committees
are industry and agribusiness oriented, with membership consisting
primarily of the largest business interests in each sector. Only
one committee, the Inter-Governmental Policy Advisory Committee (IGPAC)
represents state interests and is well represented by state policy
makers. While USTR consults regularly with industry advisory committees
that frequently draft key sections of the trade agreements, IGPAC has
very limited influence.
Furthermore, the TAC system disallows public debate and
participation. TAC members must keep all information regarding
pending agreements and TAC discussions confidential until after the
agreement is signed. Ironically, the security clearance that
public officials must submit to in order to become members of IGPAC
means that they are forbidden to disclose the draft texts of negotiated
agreements, preventing those with the most complete and up-to-date
information from using that information to inform the public dialogue.
USTR itself is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act or the
Administrative Procedures Act. Consequently, no records exist of
TAC discussions, how often committees meet, who testifies before USTR,
what they say, and how it impacts the drafting of the text. And
Congress, operating under the constraints of “fast track” or the
President’s Trade Promotion Authority, is limited to 20 hours of debate
on trade agreements and a straight up or down vote. Congress
cannot modify an agreement, but must reject it entirely to have it
modified.
We are concerned that the policy making process for DR-CAFTA has
suffered from these problems, that the agreement has been crafted
without the benefit of full public discussion and participation, and
that the voices and interests of Maine workers, businesses, and
citizens are not adequately reflected in it. Maine's
Congressional delegation has frequently been in the forefront of
debates on trade, globalization, and the reach of federal trade
negotiating authority. We deeply appreciate the time and attention that
the delegation has devoted to these questions so integral to our
economy and democracy. At this point, the low level of disclosure
and public discussion regarding the United States trade negotiating
agenda, and USTR's weak accountability necessitate a review of USTR's
negotiating mandate and federal-state consultation mechanisms. We
urge you to continue to exercise leadership in Congress to help defeat
DR-CAFTA and work with us to ensure that the process for future trade
agreement negotiations is democratic and transparent, and reflects the
diverse interests and concerns of Maine workers, businesses, and
citizens.
